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Abstract—Children are increasingly accessing social media content through mobile devices.
Existing data protection regulations have focused on defining the digital age of consent, in order
to limit collection of children’s personal data by organizations. However, children can easily
bypass the mechanisms adopted by apps to verify their age, and thereby be exposed to privacy
and safety threats. We conducted a study to identify how the top 10 social and communication
apps among underage users apply age limits in their Terms of Use. We also assess the
robustness of the mechanisms these apps put in place to verify the age of their users. Moreover,
we discuss how automated age recognition techniques can be adopted to increase the
effectiveness of the age verification process. Finally, we provide recommendations to app
providers and developers to specify the Terms of Use and implement robust age verification
mechanisms.




The widespread adoption of smartphones and
tablets has allowed even small children to use
mobile apps. A report () describing children’s use
of social media between 2015 and 2019 has indi-
cated that, by the age of 3-4, children often access
online content unsupervised by an adult. By the
age of 15, about 89% of the children surveyed had
a social media profile. There are different reasons
inducing a child to have a social media profile,
such as chatting with friends, seeking new virtual
friends, or increasing popularity by publishing
pictures and videos.
Existing data protection regulations, such
as the Children’s Online Data Protection Act
(COPPA) in the USA and the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe, have
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mainly focused on regulating collection of chil-
dren’s personal data. They have defined the con-
cept of digital age of consent, i.e. the minimum
age a user must be before organizations can col-
lect, process and store their data without parental
consent. Users under this age are referred to
as underage users. The GDPR also requires the
controller to verify that consent is given by the
holder of parental responsibility over the child.
However, some apps do not even ask for the age
of their users during sign-up. Even when they
do so, they provide very limited mechanisms to
verify that a user is inputting his/her real age. As a
result, children can easily bypass the mechanisms
adopted by apps to verify the age of the user [2].
In some instances, providers have created al-
ternative versions of their apps for kids. For ex-
ample, Messenger Kids — the Facebook Messen-
ger version for children — only allows children to
connect with parent-approved contacts and does
not allow deletion of messages. SnapKidz — the
Snapchat version for children under 13 — lets
users take, edit and store pictures locally, but
it does not allow sending and receiving snaps.
Because these apps only provide a limited set of
functionalities, children prefer to lie about their
age, in order to use apps originally designed
for adults. This makes children more vulnerable
to privacy and even safety threats [3], such as
cyberbullying, online grooming, or exposure to
content that may be inappropriate for their age.
Very few approaches (e.g. [4]) have consid-
ered underage users during the software engineer-
ing process. As far as we are aware, this is the
first work to assess whether the laws regulating
the digital age of consent and the age veri-
fication mechanisms implemented by apps can
protect underage users. In this paper we provide
a brief overview of the COPPA and the GDPR
provisions about the digital age of consent. We
subsequently report on a study aimed to review
the top 10 social and communication apps used
by children in 2019 and 2020. We assess how
these apps implement age limits in their Terms
of Use and what mechanisms they put in place
to verify the age of their users. Moreover, we
review existing biometrics-based age recognition
techniques to assess whether and how they can be
used to improve robustness of the age verification
process. We conclude the paper by providing
a set of recommendations to app providers and
developers.
DIGITAL AGE OF CONSENT
The widespread use of age of 13 as the
minimum age for accessing social media ser-
vices derives from the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA), effective in the USA
since 2000. Digital service providers are obliged
to acquire verifiable parental consent for chil-
dren under the age of 13, who may use their
service. Means of supplying parental consent
include electronic scans, parental payment sys-
tems, video or phone conference, or through the
use of government-issued IDs. Due to the costs
and complexity involved, many service providers
choose not to allow children to use such services
by restricting access via their terms of use to those
over the age of 13.
Prior to the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which came into effect in
2018, there were no specific restrictions on the
processing of children’s data in Europe. Under
Article 8, GDPR requires children below the
age of digital consent (13-16) to have verifiable
parental consent for the processing of their data.
Enhanced data protection for children by design
and by default (Article 23) is therefore one of
the key measures contained within GDPR. EU
member states are also free to set a different
digital age of consent, between 13 and 16 years,
thus leading to a more complex range of age
limits that apply across Europe. For example,
Ireland, France, The Netherlands, and Germany
have opted for 16, while Italy and Spain have
set the age to 14; while the UK, Denmark, and
Sweden have set the age at 13.
In contrast to COPPA which has quite specific
requirements and conditions, the GDPR does not
specify how parental consent should be obtained,
nor does it oblige service providers to obtain any
additional verification of age once users register,
truthfully or otherwise, to access their service.
In practice, such restrictions are likely to come
from codes of conduct which the GDPR encour-
ages member states and supervisory authorities to
develop. In the meantime, most service providers
have responded by limiting the nature and amount
of data they collect from users under the digital
age of consent, while continuing to place the main
2 IEEE Software
Authorized licensed use limited to: Technological University Dublin. Downloaded on November 25,2021 at 09:57:47 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
0740-7459 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/MS.2020.3044872, IEEE Software
emphasis on restricting access to under-13s in
order to avoid infringing COPPA regulations.
TERMS OF USE AND AGE
VERIFICATION
We evaluated how social and communication
apps implement age limits in their Terms of Use
(ToU) and what mechanisms they put in place to
verify the age of their users. We addressed the
following research questions (RQs):
1) Do the ToU of social and communication
apps take into account the age limits pre-
scribed by existing data protection regula-
tions?
2) Do social and communication apps imple-
ment robust mechanisms to verify the age
of their users?
3) After the enactment of the GDPR were
there any changes in the age limits specified
in the ToU and/or the mechanisms adopted
by social and communication apps to verify
the age of their users?
This study was commissioned by Cyber-
SafeIreland, an Irish not-for-profit organization
that aims to empower children, parents and teach-
ers to navigate the online world in a safe and
responsible manner. In our study we consid-
ered apps categorized in the social (Snapchat,
Instagram, TikTok, HouseParty, Facebook) and
communication (WhatsApp, Viber, Messenger,
Skype, Discord) categories in the Google app
store. According to the data collected from Cy-
berSafeIreland’s annual survey of children’s use
of social media [5], these are the most used social
and messaging apps by children, aged 8-13. This
study focused on mobile apps to reflect the usage
of children in this age category: according to
CyberSafeIreland, 92% of children own a mobile
device, only 20% own a laptop and less than 10%
own a desktop computer.
The set of the most popular apps has not
changed between 2019 and 2020. Table 1 shows a
summary of our results for Snapchat, WhatsApp,
Instagram, TikTok, and Viber. Table 2 shows a
summary of our results for Messenger, Skype,
HouseParty, Discord, and Facebook. For each ap-
plication we answered eight questions. Questions
1-2 address RQ1, while Questions 3-8 address
RQ2. We indicate explicitly in both tables when
the answer to a question has changed between
2019 and 2020. To answer RQ3 we compared the
results obtained in the study performed in 2019
with those obtained in 2020.
We performed the study for the first time in
April 2019 and repeated it in April 2020. Each
study was conducted by one of the authors and the
results were cross-validated by a different author.
We acquired the ToU from the settings of each
app and also online from the respective websites
of each app. We installed each app on a new
Nokia 2.3 smartphone, and attempted to create
an account for three fake users aged 12, 13 and
16. To test each app we performed the sign-up
by providing a date of birth —when requested—
that suggested ages 12, 13, and 16. The interested
reader can find the detailed results obtained for
the top 10 apps in 2019 [6] and 2020 [7] online.
Terms of Use. 7 apps set the minimum age
for using their service to 13 years in their ToU.
WhatsApp set the age limit to 16 to take into
account GDPR requirements. Although in 2019
Skype set the minimum age to 13, it removed this
age limit in 2020. Thus, a user aged 12 or below
can still create an account with parental consent.
Discord does not state clearly the minimum age
in its ToU. None of the apps takes into account
the differences between the EU members w.r.t.
the digital age of consent, except Facebook, In-
stagram, and Messenger that specify that in Spain
the age limit is 14.
Request to provide an age during sign-up.
WhatsApp and Discord are the only apps that do
not require a user to input his/her age during sign-
up.
Account creation for underage users.
Among the apps that require users to provide an
age during sign-up, 7 do not allow the creation
of an account, when an age below the limit (12)
is provided. Since 2020, only Skype allows the
user to create an account after receiving parental
consent via email.
Age verification. The app that, in our opinion,
employs the most robust age verification mecha-
nism is the 2020 version of TikTok. During sign-
up, it asks the user to enter his/her date of birth.
If the user enters an age below 13 (e.g., 12), s/he
gets a message stating that s/he is not eligible
to sign-up. To create a TikTok account, a user
would have to either supply proof of an age that
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Table 1. Management of Underage Users in Snapchat, WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok, and Viber.
Question Snapchat WhatsApp Instagram TikTok Viber
1) What is the minimum age
stated in the terms of use? 13 16 13 13 13
2) Is the minimum age the same
across all EU countries? Yes 16 No, in Spain is
14
Yes Yes
3) Is it mandatory to input the
age on sign-up? Yes No Yes Yes Yes
4) If the answer to the previous
question is yes, what happens if
age 12 is entered?
Cannot create
an account






5) If you enter age 13, are there
any additional verification pro-
cesses?
No N/A Recommends to
send an email to
a parent
No No
6) Is it possible to bypass the




N/A Yes, providing a
false age





7) If age 16 is entered on sign-
up, is there any age verification
process enabled?
No N/A No No No
8) At any point, is the minimum
age made clear to the user? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2. Management of Underage Users in Messenger, Skype, HouseParty, Discord, and Facebook.
Question Messenger Skype HouseParty Discord Facebook
1) What is the minimum
age stated in the Terms
of Use?
13 • 13 (2019)
• None (2020)
13 Unclear 13
2) Is the minimum age
the same across all EU
countries?
• Yes (2019)
• No, in Spain is
14 (2020)
Yes Yes Yes No, in Spain is 14
3) Is it mandatory to in-
put the age on sign-up? • No (2019)• Yes (2020)
Yes Yes No Yes
4) If the answer to the
previous question is yes,
what happens if age 12
is entered?
• N/A (2019)
• Cannot create an
account (2020)






• Cannot create an
account (2020)
N/A • N/A (2019)
• Cannot create an
account (2020)
5) If you enter age
13, are there any ad-
ditional verification pro-
cesses (e.g. emailing a
parent)?
No Send an email to a
parent
No N/A Optionally ask for
parent approval
6) Is it possible to by-








N/A Yes, providing a
false age
7) If age 16 is entered
on sign-up, is there any
age verification process
enabled?
No No No N/A No
8) At any point, is
the minimum age made
clear to the user?
• No, in 2019
• Yes, in 2020
No Yes No Yes
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is over or equal 13 to TikTok support or else
sign-up on another device. However, if the user
enters an age equal or over 13 from the start, s/he
will be able to sign-up simply lying about his/her
age. A less robust age verification mechanism
is offered by Facebook. If the user enters an
age below 13 during sign-up, s/he is prevented
from creating a Facebook account. However, if
the user enters an age equal or over 13 s/he can
create an account without providing any proof to
demonstrate his/her age. For 7 of the apps, a child
can circumvent all age verification mechanisms
by entering a false age. Besides TikTok, Messen-
ger also makes it somewhat difficult to create an
account as an older user, after attempting to sign-
up as a 12 year old. It was indeed necessary to
clear the cache and remove both Facebook and
Messenger apps, in order to restart the sign-up
process. With HouseParty, it was necessary to
re-install the app to bypass the age verification
mechanisms enacted during sign-up.
For users aged 13-15, 7 apps do not im-
plement any age verification mechanisms. Only
Instagram recommends asking a parent for ap-
proval to use the app, Facebook optionally gives
a child the chance to ask for parental approval,
and Skype, instead, requires the approval by a
parent up to the age of consent.
However, if the age 16 is provided as input,
none of the apps require a proof of age.
Minimum age during sign-up. All the apps
make the minimum age to use their services clear
during sign-up and/or in the ToU, with the excep-
tions of Skype and Discord. For some of the apps,
such as Snapchat, the ToU suggest differences
that the functionality may be restricted for 13-16
years old, without specifying how. Other apps,
such as Viber, make no differences between the
privacy settings for a 13 year old, and those for
a 16 year old or older.
Changes after the enactment of GDPR.
Although the age verification mechanisms an-
alyzed are still insufficient to protect underage
users, we noted a number of new developments
since 2019, when the tests were first conducted.
There are now some restrictions in place that
might act as a deterrent to underage users. On
certain apps, it is quite challenging after giving
an initial age of 12, and being rejected, to start
the sign-up process again pretending to be 13
or older. TikTok put in place the most difficult
age verification mechanism to bypass, as a direct
result of financial penalties imposed for non-
compliance with data protection legislation.
Messenger now asks for an age during sign-
up. It does not explicitly request parental consent
for 13-15 year olds to create an account, but
provides an option to change the privacy settings
and get parental consent. This suggests that there
are extra data protection measures in place for 13
to 15 year olds by default. Finally, Skype now
accepts a user at age of 12, in direct contrast to
most of the other apps which have a minimum
age of 13. The app does however insist on the
user obtaining parental consent, and this must be
done via a Microsoft account.
USING BIOMETRICS FOR AGE
VERIFICATION
Table 3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Biometric






























A possible solution to implement more robust
age verification mechanisms is to use biometrics
features, that are unique to the app user. Thus, we
analyzed advantages and disadvantages of some
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of the existing age recognition techniques using
biometrics features, shown in Table 3. Speech
recognition [8] has been adopted for age-group
identification for children aged 5-16. Using spe-
cific regions in the speech bandwidth that contain
the most important information for classification,
this approach can achieve an accuracy of 85.8%
in the best scenario. However, speech may not be
a reliable feature for age recognition for children
aged 11-13, due to variations in the timing of the
onset of puberty. Also using speech recognition
for age verification purposes can be bypassed
easily by playing voice recordings.
Fingerprint characteristics [9], such as the
Ridge Thickness to Valley Thickness Ratio and
the Ridge Count have also been used for age
group recognition. This approach has high accu-
racy (82.14%) and it is hard to circumvent, be-
cause it is difficult to falsify fingerprint readings.
However, it does not guarantee the anonymity of
the user and requires a fingerprint reader.
Using facial features represents a promising
avenue for age recognition. For example, Levi
and Hassner [10] describe the use of a deep
convolutional neural network (CNN) for age clas-
sification, using only three convolutional layers
and two fully connected layers with a small
number of neurons. This approach uses facial
features, such as the distance measurements be-
tween facial points and the skin elasticity, and
it is very effective especially with low quality
images. On the one hand, since these facial
features are insufficient to identify a user, age
recognition techniques based on these features
can ensure user anonymity. However, on the other
hand, these age recognition techniques can also
be circumvented easily using a picture of an adult.
Ear features extracted from anthropometric
landmarks of the ear (distance measurements and
area calculations) have also been adopted for age
classification [11]. However, ear features are not
a very decisive characteristic in a person growth
and there is an insufficient amount of training
samples for each age group. Thus, this approach
has lower accuracy compared to the techniques
based on speech, fingerprint and face traits.
Iris images have also been used to distin-
guish users between different age groups using
a combination of a small number of geometric
features [12]. However, in order to have good
accuracy, this technique requires the use of a near
infrared camera which may not always be avail-
able on a mobile device. Other researchers [13]
have trained a classifier using iris images cap-
tured with a mobile phone obtaining a lower
accuracy in age group identification. Because iris
features are used for person identification, they
are quite intrusive and may not ensure anonymity.
In summary, the classification techniques for age
recognition that have the highest accuracy have
the limitation of either requiring additional hard-
ware (fingerprint, iris) or to be easy to circumvent
(speech, face features).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Existing data protection regulations are in-
effective without clarity in relation to how age
verification mechanism should be enforced in the
ToU and in the implementation of apps. In reality,
the application of substantial financial penalties
(e.g., the case of TikTok) was the main trigger
for app providers to implement more effective
age verification mechanisms. Based on our study
and on our survey about biometrics-based age
recognition techniques, we propose the following
recommendations to app providers and develop-
ers.
Clarify the minimum age and treatment of
data. Existing apps should ensure that a clear,
concise and age-appropriate summary of the rel-
evant parts of the app’s ToU is presented to users
who sign-up and declare their age to be under 18.
This summary should clearly explain how their
data is used for targeted advertising.
Enable the most restrictive privacy settings.
Apps should apply the most restrictive privacy
settings by default for any user that declares
themselves to be under the age of 18. For exam-
ple, photos, posts and messages should only be
shared with “friends”, location data should not be
collected at all. It should also not be possible to
override privacy settings without explicit parental
consent.
Encourage users not to lie about their age.
Despite the presence of a minimum age require-
ment, many underage users continue to use social
and communication apps. Thus, users must be
incentivised to be honest about their age, with
minimal data being collected in this case. Giving
a user an option to go back and change their
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date of birth in order to bypass any restrictions
encourages them to lie about their age. Providing
mechanisms that deter a user from installing an
app on a device on which they have previously
declared themselves to be underage is currently
the most sensible solution and the hardest to
circumvent.
Implement Robust Age Verification Mecha-
nisms. Where a minimum age requirement is put
in place, it should be backed up by appropriate
age verification mechanisms. Using age recog-
nition techniques based on biometrics factors,
such as facial features, may not be sufficient
considering that these can be circumvented. Thus,
we recommend age verification as an ongoing
process that does not terminate after sign-up. For
example, age verification can analyze information
generated from the use of an app (e.g., texts,
content exchanged) [14] to assess whether a user
lied about his/her age at the moment of sign-up.
Alternatively, an adult can enter the age of his/her
child in the OS setting of the phone (like Android
settings). During sign-up, apps can then obtain the
age of a user directly from the phone settings.
CONCLUSION
This paper has the main objective to raise
awareness about management of underage users
in apps. We recommend app providers to increase
robustness of the age verification techniques im-
plemented during sign-up and to clarify the min-
imum age of use and the treatment of personal
data. Because our recommendations do not take
into account the specific functionalities of an app,
they could be generalized to other apps that re-
quire to implement age limits in their ToU and/or
robust age verification mechanisms. We focused
our study on the mobile version of the top 10
social and communication apps among underage
users. These apps were downloaded from the Irish
app store. Thus, our results concerning robustness
of age verification mechanisms may not be gen-
eralizable to the PC version of the top 10 apps
or to the versions of the apps available in another
geographical location (e.g., North America, Asia).
In future work, we will assess robustness of
the age verification mechanisms adopted in the
PC version of the app considered in this study. We
will also perform empirical studies to understand
a) how to present information about the minimum
age and the treatment of data to users below 18,
and b) which age verification solutions are most
likely to be bypassed by young users. Finally, we
will focus our attention on the specific differences
in privacy settings and data collected by social
and communication apps where a user has signed
up and declared themselves to be aged 13-15
(with or without obtaining parental consent).
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